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1 Introduction
This chapter proposes an overview of some aspects of Software Reliability (SR) engineering.
Most systems are now driven by software. So that, it is well-recognized that assessing reliabil-
ity of software applications is a major issue in reliability engineering, particularly in terms of
cost. But predicting software reliability is not easy. Perhaps the major difficulty is that we are
concerned primarily with design faults which is a very different situation from that tackled by
the conventional hardware theory. A fault (or bug ) refers to the manifestation in the code of a
mistake made by the programmer or designer with respect to the specification of the software.
Activation of a fault by an input value leads to an incorrect output. Detection of such an event
corresponds to an occurrence of a software failure. Input values may be considered as arriving
to the software randomly. So although software failure may be not generated stochastically, it
may be detected in such a manner. Therefore, this justifies the use of stochastic models of the
underlying random process that governs the software failures. We briefly recall in Section 2,
basic concepts of stochastic modeling for reliability. Two approaches are used in SR modeling.
The prevalent is the so-called black-box one, in which only the interactions of the software with
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the environment are considered. Following [1] and [2], we use in Section 3 the self-exciting
point processes as basic tool to model the failure process. That enables an overview of most
of published SR models. A second approach, called the white-box one, incorporates in models,
information on the structure of the software. This is presented in Section 4. Section 5 proposes
basic techniques for calibrating black-box models. The last section tries to give an account
for the current practices in SR modeling and to point out some challenging issues for future
research.
Note that this chapter does not aspire to cover the whole topic of SR engineering. In partic-
ular, we do not discuss: fault prevention, fault removal, fault tolerance which are three methods
to achieve reliable software. We focus here on methods to forecast failure times. For a more
complete view, we refer to [3], the handbooks [4] and [5]. We have used the two recent books [2]
and [6] to prepare this chapter. We also recommend to read the short paper [7], that describes, in
particular, the available software reliability toolkits (with additional relevant reference [8]). Fi-
nally, the bibliography of the chapter gives a good account for journals which propose research
and tutorial papers on SR.
2 Basic concepts of stochastic modeling
Reliability of a software is defined in [9] as a measure of the continuous delivery of the correct
service by the software under a specified environment. This is a measure of the time to failure.
2.1 Metrics with regard to the first failure
Metrics of the first time to failure of a system are standard from [10], [11] and are now recalled.
The first failure time is a random variable (rv) T with distribution function
F (t) = PfT  tg; t 2 R:
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If F has a probability density function (pdf) f then we define the hazard rate of the rv T by
r(t) =
f(t)
R(t)
; t  0:
with R(t) = 1   F (t) = PfT > tg. We will also use the term failure rate. Function R(t) is
called the survivor function of the rv T . Hazard rate function is interpreted to be
r(t)dt  Pft < T  t + dt j T > tg
 Pf a failure occurs in ]t; t + dt] given that no failure occurred up to time t g
Thus, the phenomenon of reliability growth (“wear-out”) may be represented by an decreasing
(increasing) hazard rate.
When F is continuous, hazard rate function characterizes the probability distribution of T
through the exponentiation formula
R(t) = exp

 
Z
t
0
r(s)ds

:
Finally, the mean time to failure, denoted by MTTF, is the expectationE[T ] of the waiting
time of the first failure. Note that E[T ] is also
R
+1
0
R(s)ds.
A basic model for the nonnegative rv T is the Weibull distribution with parameters;  > 0:
f(t) = t
 1
exp
 
 t


1
]0;+1[
(t) R(t) = exp
 
 t


; r(t) = t
 1
;
MTTF =
1

1=
Z
+1
0
u
1=
exp( u)du:
Note that the hazard rate is increasing for  > 1, decreasing for  < 1, constant for  = 1. For
 = 1 we obtain the exponential model with parameter .
2.2 Stochastic process of times of failure
The failure process can be thought of as a point process (pp), i.e. a sequence of rvs (T
i
)
i0
where T
i
is the ith failure time of the software (with T
0
= 0). An equivalent point of view is to
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define the sequence of rv X
i
= T
i
  T
i 1
for i  1. X
i
is ith inter-failure time. We define the
counting process N() associated with a pp by
N(t) =
X
i0
1
]0;t]
(T
i
) (N(0) = 0):
N(t) is the number of observed failures up to time t. A pp will refer to any of (T
i
), (X
i
) or
N(). Standard metrics associated with a counting process are [11]:
– the mean value function: M(t) = E[N(t)]
– the rate of occurrence of failures at time t: ROCOF(t) = dM
dt
(t).
In such a context, we define the (conditional) reliability function at time t  0 by
R
t
(s) = PfN(t+ s) N(t) = 0 j N(t); T
1
; : : : ; T
N(t)
g; s  0:
This is a measure of the continuous delivery of correct service during the mission interval
]t; t + s]. At time t = T
i
, this function is nothing else but the conditional survivor function
of rv X
i+1
= T
i+1
  T
i
given T
1
; : : : ; T
i
. This will be denoted by R
i
(s). We also define the
(conditional) mean time to failure at time t, MTTF(t), by
MTTF(t) =
Z
+1
0
R
t
(s)ds:
The mean time to failure at t = T
i
will also denoted by MTTF
i
and is E[X
i+1
j T
1
; : : : ; T
i
].
During the operational life of a software, repairs are carried out when it fails to perform
correctly. In such a case, time to repair, time to reboot the system and others factors affect the
dependability of a product. Thus, we may define the software availability as a measure of the
delivery correct service with respect to the alternation correct and incorrect service. Availability
is highly dependent on the maintenance policies of the software. We do not go into further
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details on dependability in operational phase. Indeed, we focus here on the reliability attribute
of the software as most of the literature on software reliability modeling does. We refer to [4,
Chap 2] for an account for dependability during the operational phase.
3 Black-box software reliability models
In this section, only dynamic models will be discussed. That is, we are only concerned with
models which consider failure process as a stochastic process. In other words, time is an essen-
tial component of the description of the models. On the other hand, static models are essentially
capture-recapture models. For a good account for static models, we refer to [12, Chap 5], [6].
A recent evaluation of capture-recapture models in software engineering context is [13]. Our
overview of dynamic models closely follows [1, Chap 2], [14], [2], [15]. We assume throughout
this section that any corrective action is instantaneous and each detected fault is removed.
A basic way to represent time evolution in confidence in a software is as follows. At instant
0, the first failure occurs at time t
1
according a rv X
1
= T
1
with hazard rate r
1
. Given time
T
1
= t
1
, we observe a second failure at time t
2
at rate r
2
. Function r
2
is the hazard rate of the
inter-failure rv X
2
= T
2
  T
1
given T
1
= t
1
. Choice of r
2
is based on the fact that one fault
was detected at time t
1
. At time t
2
, a third failure occurs at t
3
with failure rate r
3
. Function
r
3
is the hazard rate of the rv X
3
= T
3
  T
2
given T
1
= t
1
; T
2
= t
2
and is selected according
to the “past” of the failure process at time t
2
: two observed failures at times t
1
and t
2
. And
so on. It is expected that, due to a fault removal activity, confidence in the software’s ability
to deliver a proper service will be improved during its lifecycle. Therefore, a basic model in
SR has to capture a phenomenon of reliability growth. Reliability growth will basically follow
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from a sequence of inequalities of the following form
r
i+1
(t   t
i
)  r
i
(t
i
) on t  t
i
(1)
and/or from selection of decreasing hazard rates r
i
(). We illustrate this “modeling process” on
the celebrated Jelinski-Moranda model (JM) [16]. We assume a priori that software includes
only a finite number N of faults. The first hazard rate is r
1
(t ; ;N) = N where  is some
nonnegative parameter. From time T
1
= t
1
, a second failure occurs with the constant failure
rate r
2
(t ; ;N) = (N   1), : : : In a more formal setting, the two parametersN and  will be
encompassed in what we call a background history F
0
, which is any background information
that we may have about the software. Then “the failure rate” of the software is represented by
the function
8t  0; r
C
(t ; F
0
) =
+1
X
i=1
r
i
(t  T
i 1
; F
0
)1
[T
i 1
;T
i
[
(t) (2)
which is called the concatenated failure rate function in [2]. An appealing graphical display of
a path of this stochastic function is in Figure 1 for (JM). We can rewrite (2) as
r
C
(t ; ;N)



N
0 tt
1
t
2
t
3
Figure 1: Concatenated failure rate function for (JM)
(t ; F
0
; N(t); T
1
; : : : ; T
N(t)
) = (N  N(t)) (3)
Function () will be called the stochastic intensity of the pp N(). We see that stochastic
intensity for (JM) is proportional to the residual number of bugs at any time t and each detection
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of failure results in a failure rate whose value decreases of amount . This suggests that no new
fault is inserted during a corrective action and any bug contributes in the same manner to the
“failure rate” of the software.
To go further, we replace our intuitive presentation in a stochastic modeling framework.
Justification for what follows is that almost all published software reliability models can be
interpreted in the foregoing framework. Specifically, this allows a complete overview of the
stochastic properties of the panoply of available models without referring to their original pre-
sentations.
3.1 Self-Exciting Point Processes
A slightly more formal presentation of the previous construction of the point process (T
i
) would
be: we have to specify all the conditional distributions
L(X
i
j F
0
; T
i 1
; : : : T
1
); i  1:
The sequence of conditioningF
0
; fF
0
; T
1
g; fF
0
; T
1
; T
2
g; : : : should be thought of as the natural
or internal history on the pp at times 0; T
1
; T
2
; : : : respectively. So that, function r
i
is the hazard
rate of the conditional distribution L(X
i
j F
0
; T
i 1
; : : : ; T
1
), that is, when it has a pdf
r
i
(t ; F
0
; T
i 1
; : : : ; T
1
) =
f
X
i
jF
0
;T
i 1
;::: ;T
1
(t)
R
X
i
jF
0
;T
i 1
;::: ;T
1
(t)
: (4)
This leads to the following expression of the stochastic intensity
(t ; F
0
; N(t); T
1
; : : : ; T
N(t)
) =
+1
X
i=1
f
X
i
jF
0
;T
i 1
;::: ;T
1
(t   T
i 1
)
R
X
i
jF
0
;T
i 1
;::: ;T
1
(t  T
i 1
)
1
[T
i 1
;T
i
[
(t): (5)
If we turn back to the (JM) model, we have F
0
= f;Ng and
f
X
i
jF
0
;T
i 1
;::: ;T
1
(t) = (N   (i  1)) exp ( (N   (i  1)) t)1
[0;+1[
(t):
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Continuing in this way, this should lead to the martingale approach for analyzing pp, that es-
sentially adheres to the concepts of compensator and stochastic intensity with respect to the
internal history of the counting process. In particular, the left continuous version of the stochas-
tic intensity defined in (5) may be thought of as the usual predictable intensity of a pp in the
martingale point of view (see e.g. [17, Th11] and references therein). van Pul gives in [18] a
good account for what can be done using the so-called dynamic approach of pp. We do not go
into further details here. We prefer embrace the engineering point of view developed in [15].
It is clear from (5) that the stochastic intensity is excited by the history of the pp itself. Such
stochastic processes are usually called a self-exciting point process (SEPP). What follows is
from [1], [2], [15].
1. H
t
= fN(t); T
1
; : : : ; T
N(t)
g will denote the internal history of N() up to time t.
2. N() is said to be conditionally orderly if for any Q
t
 H
t
, we have
PfN(t+ dt) N(t)  2 j F
0
; Q
t
g = PfN(t+ dt)  N(t) = 1 j F
0
; Q
t
gO(dt):
where O(dt) is some real-valued function such that lim
dt!0
O(dt) = 0.
With Q
t
= ; and Formula (6), we get PfN(t+ dt)   N(t)  2 j F
0
g = o(dt) where o(dt)
is some real-valued function such that lim
dt!0
o(dt)=dt = 0. This is the usual orderliness or
regular property of a pp [11]. Conditional orderliness is to be interpreted as saying that given
Q
t
and F
0
, as dt decreases to zero, the probability of at least two failures occurring in a time
interval of length dt tends to zero at a rate higher than the probability that exactly one failure in
the same interval does.
Definition 3.1 A pp N() is called a self-exciting point process if
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1. N() is conditionally orderly;
2. there exists a nonnegative function ( ; F
0
;H
t
) such that
PfN(t+ dt)  N(t) = 1 j F
0
;H
t
g = (t ; F
0
;H
t
)dt + o(dt) (6)
and E

(t ; F
0
;H
t
)

< +1 for any t > 0
3. PfN(0) = 0 j F
0
g = 1
Function  is called the stochastic intensity of the SEPP.
We must think (t ; F
0
;H
t
) of as a function of F
0
, t and N(t); T
1
; : : : ; T
N(t)
. Degree to which
(t) depends on H
t
is formalized in the notion of memory. A SEPP is of memory-m, if
– for m = 0: () depends on H
t
only through N(t) the number of observed failures at time t;
– for m = 1: () depends on H
t
only through N(t) and T
N(t)
;
– for m  2: () depends on H
t
only through N(t); T
N(t)
; : : : T
N(t) m+1
;
– for m =  1: () is independent of the history H
t
of the pp. We also say that stochastic
intensity has no memory.
When stochastic intensity depends only on a background history F
0
, then we get a Doubly
Stochastic Poisson Process (DSPP). Thus, the class of SEPP also encompasses the family of
Poisson Processes. If intensity is a non-random constant , we have the Homogeneous Pois-
son Process (HPP). A SEPP with no memory and a deterministic intensity function (), is a
NonHomogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP). In particular, if we turn back to the concatenated
failure rate function (see (2)), then selecting a NHPP model corresponds to selecting some con-
tinuous deterministic function as r
C
. We see that, given T
i
= t
i
, the hazard rate of X
i+1
is
9
ri+1
() = r
C
( + t
i
) = ( + t
i
). We retrieve a well-known fact for a NHPP: the (conditional)
hazard rate between ith and i + 1th failure times and the intensity function () only differ
through the initial time of observation of the two functions. We list properties of SEPP [15]
which are of some value for analyzing the main characteristics of models. We will omit to write
the dependence in F
0
.
Counting statistics for SEPP
The probability distribution of rv N(t) is strongly related to the conditional expectation
b
(t ; N(t)) = E

(t ; H
t
) j N(t)

:
This function is called the count-conditional intensity. For a SEPP, b( ; N(t)) satisfies
b
(t ; N(t)) = lim
dt!0
PfN(t+ dt)  N(t) = 1 j N(t)g
dt
= lim
dt!0
PfN(t+ dt)  N(t)  1 j N(t)g
dt
:
Then we can obtain the following explicit representation for PfN(t) = ng with n  1
PfN(t) = ng =
Z
0<t
1
<<t
n
<t
n
Y
i=1
b
(t
i
; i   1) exp

 
n
X
i=0
Z
t
i+1
t
i
b
(u ; i)du

dt
1
: : : dt
n
(7)
with t
0
= 0 and t
n+1
= t.
ROCOF(t), defined as the derivate of M(t), is then
ROCOF(t) = E
h
b
(t ; N(t))
i
= E[(t ; H
t
)]:
We see that notion of ROCOF(t) and stochastic intensity coincide only if intensity is a deter-
ministic function of time, i.e. the pp is a NHPP.
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Likelihood function for a SEPP
Assume that we observe a fixed number i of failures. Then the likelihood function is
f
T
1
;::: ;T
i
(t
1
; : : : ; t
i
) = (t
1
; 0)
i
Y
k=2
(t
k
; k   1; t
1
; : : : ; t
k 1
)
exp

 
Z
t
1
0
(s ; 0)ds 
i
X
k=2
Z
t
k
t
k 1
(s ; k   1; t
1
; : : : ; t
k 1
)ds

(8)
If we observe the failure process up to time t, the joint distribution of N(t); T
1
; : : : ; T
N(t)
is
given in [15, Th6.2.2].
Reliability and MTTF functions
R
t
(s) = exp

 
Z
t+s
t
(u ; N(t); T
1
; : : : ; T
N(t)
)du

In particular at instant T
i
, we obtain
R
i
(s) =
8
<
:
exp
 
 
R
s
0
(u ; 0)du

if i = 0
exp

 
R
T
i
+s
T
i
(u ; i; T
1
; : : : ; T
i
)du

if i  1.
The following characterization of 0-memory SEPP is intuitively clear from the definition of
the stochastic intensity of a SEPP.
Theorem 3.2 N() is a SEPP with 0-memory is equivalent to N() is a Markov process.
This result explains why a very large part of SR models may be developed in a Markov frame-
work (see e.g. [12], [3, Chap 10]). In particular, all NHPP models are of Markov-type. In
fact, it can be shown [15] that a SEPP with m-memory corresponds to a process (T
i
) which is a
m-order Markov chain, that is L(T
i+1
j T
i
; : : : ; T
1
) = L(T
i+1
j T
i
; : : : T
i m+1
) for i  m.
A last relevant result is concerned with 1-memory SEPP.
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Theorem 3.3 A 1-memory SEPP with a stochastic intensity satisfying
(t ; N(t); T
N(t)
) = f(N(t); t   T
N(t)
)
for some real-valued function f , is characterized by a sequence of independent inter-failure
durations (X
i
). In this case, density probability function of X
i
is
f
X
i
(x
i
) = f(i  1 ; x
i
) exp

 
Z
x
i
0
f(i  1 ; u)du

: (9)
Such a SEPP was called a generalized renewal process in [19] because T
i
is the sum of indepen-
dent but not identically distributed rv. Moreover, it is an usual renewal process when function
f does not depend on N(t).
To close this presentation of self-exciting processes, we point out that we only use a “con-
structive” point of view. Our purpose, here, is not to discuss the existence of point processes
with a fixed concatenated failure rate function or stochastic intensity. However, we emphasize
that orderliness condition and existence of the limit in (6) in Definition 3.1 are enough to spec-
ify the pp (see e.g. [20]). It is also shown in [14, Th4.1] that, under conditional orderliness
condition, concatenated failure rate function well-defines a SEPP with respect to operational
Definition 3.1. Moreover, an easily checked criterion for conditional orderliness is given [14,
Th4.2]. In particular, if hazard rates in (4) are locally bounded then conditional orderliness
holds.
3.2 Classification of SR models
We obtain from the concept of memory for a SEPP, a classification of the existing models. It is
appealing to define a model with a high memory. But, as usual, the pay-off is the complexity in
the statistical inference and the amount of data to be collected.
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3.2.1 0-memory SEPP
A first type of 0-memory SEPP is when (t ; H
t
;F
0
) = f(N(t);F
0
). We get major common
properties of this first class of models from Subsection 3.1.
– N() is a Markov process (a pure birth Markov process).
– (X
i
) are independent (given F
0
). From (9), rv X
i
has an exponential distribution with pa-
rameter f(i   1;F
0
). This easily gives a likelihood function given inter-failure durations
(X
i
).
– T
i
=
P
i
k=1
X
k
is an Hypoexponential distributed rv as the sum of i independent and expo-
nentially distributed rvs [21].
– R
t
(s) = exp ( f(N(t);F
0
)s). The reliability function only depends on the current number
of failures N(t). We have MTTF(t) = 1=f(N(t);F
0
).
Example 3.1 (JM) Jelinski-Moranda model has been introduced in Section 3. This model has
to be considered as a benchmark model, since all authors designing a new model emphasize that
their model includes JM as particular case. The stochastic intensity is given in (3) (see Figure 1
for a path). Besides properties common to the class of SEPP considered in this paragraph,
we had the following additional assumptions: the software includes a finite N of bugs in the
program and no new fault is inserted during debugging. We also noted that each fault has
the same contribution to the un-reliability of the software. These assumptions are generally
considered as questionable. We derive from (7) that the distribution of rv N(t) is Binomial with
parametersN and 1  exp( t). The main reliability metrics are:
ROCOF(t) = N exp( t);MTTF
i
=
1
N   i 
;R
i
(s) = exp
 
  (N   i )s

: (10)
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We also mention the Geometric model of Moranda [22] where the stochastic intensity is
(t ; H
t
; ; c) = c
N(t) where   0 and c 2]0; 1[.
A second class of 0-memory SEPP is when the stochastic intensity is actually a func-
tion of time t, N(t) (and F
0
). In fact we only have in this category of models, SEPP with
(t ; H
t
;F
0
) = (N   N(t))'(t) for some deterministic function '() of time t. Note that
'(t) =  gives (JM).
– N() is a Markov process.
– Let us denote
R
t
0
'(s)ds by (t). We deduce from (7) that N(t) is a Binomial distributed rv
with parametersN and p(t) = 1  exp( (t)). This leads to the term Binomial-type model
in [23]. It follows that E[N(t)] = Np(t) and ROCOF(t) = N'(t) exp( (t)).
– R
t
(s) = exp
 
  (N  N(t))((s+ t)   (t))

.
– We get the likelihood function given failure times (T
i
) from (8)
f
T
1
;::: ;T
i
(t
1
; : : : ; t
i
) =
N !
(N   i)!
exp
 
  (N   i)(t
i
)

i
Y
j=1
'(t
j
) exp ( (t
j
))
– The pdf of rv T
i
is f
T
i
(t
i
) = i
 
N
i

exp( (t
i
))'(t
i
)[exp ( (t
i
))  1]
i 1
.
Littlewood’s model in [24] is an instance of a Binomial model with '(t) = =( + t) and
;  > 0.
3.2.2 NHPP model: (t ; H
t
;F
0
) = f(t;F
0
) and is deterministic
A large part of models is of NHPP-type. We refer to [25] and [6, Chap 5] for a complete list of
such models. The very appealing properties of the counting process explains the widely use of
this family of pp in SR modeling.
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– N() is a Markov process.
– We deduce from Definition 3.1 that for any t, N(t) is a Poisson distributed rv with parameter
(t) =
R
t
0
f(s;F
0
)ds. In fact, N() has independent (but nonstationary) increments, that is,
N(t
1
); N(t
2
) N(t
1
); : : : ; N(t
i 1
) N(t
i
) are independent rvs for any (t
1
; : : : ; t
i
).
– The mean value functionM(t) is (t). Then ROCOF(t) = f(t;F
0
). Such a model is called
a finite NHPP model if M(+1) < +1 and an infinite one when M(+1) = +1. Indeed,
if M(+1) < +1 then we only consider a finite number of failure times with probability 1.
– R
t
(s) = exp
 
  ((t+ s)  (t))

.
– Likelihood function given failure times (T
i
) is from (8)
f
T
1
;::: ;T
i
(t
1
; : : : ; t
i
) = exp ( (t
i
))
i
Y
k=1
f(t
k
;F
0
): (11)
Example 3.2 (GO) This model is characterized by the following mean value function and in-
tensity function: (t) = M (1   exp ( t)) and (t ; ;M) = M exp( t) for t  0.
Parameters  and M are the failure rate per fault and the finite expected (initial) number of
faults contained in the software. We see that, at any time t, the intensity function is propor-
tional to the expected remaining number of faults (t ; ;M) = (M   (t)). Thus, (GO) is
essentially a NHPP-version of (JM).
Example 3.3 (MO) For the Musa-Okumoto model [3], mean value function and intensity func-
tion are (t) = ln (t+ 1)= and (t ; ; ) = =(t+ 1) respectively.  is the initial value
of the intensity function and  is called the failure intensity decay parameter. It is easily seen
that (t ; ; ) =  exp ( (t)). Thus, intensity function exponentially decreases with the
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expected number of failures and shows that (MO) may be understood as a NHPP version of
Moranda’s Geometric model.
As quoted in [26], using a NHPP model may appear inappropriate to describe reliability
growth of a software. Indeed, this is debugging which modifies the reliability. Thus, the true
intensity function changes probably in a discontinuous manner during corrective actions. How-
ever, Miller showed in [27] that a binomial-type model of Subsection 3.2.1 may be transformed
in a NHPP variant assuming that the initial number of faults is a Poisson distributed rv with
expectation N . For instance, (JM) is transformed into (GO). Moreover, Miller showed that
binomial-type model and its NHPP variant are indistinguishable from a single realization of the
failure process. But, these two models differ as prediction model because estimates of parame-
ters are different.
3.2.3 1-memory SEPP with (t ; H
t
;F
0
) = f(N(t); t   T
N(t)
;F
0
)
N() is not Markovian. But the inter-failure durations (X
i
) are independent rvs given F
0
(see
Theorem 3.3) and the pdf of rv X
i
is given in (9).
Example 3.4 (LV) Stochastic intensity of the Littlewood-Verrall model [28] is
(t ; H
t
; ;  ()) =

 (N(t) + 1) + t   T
N(t)
(12)
for some nonnegative function (). We briefly recall the Bayesian rationale underlying the def-
inition of this model. Uncertainty about the debugging operation is represented by a sequence
of stochastically decreasing failure rates (
i
)
i1
, that is

j

st

j 1
; i.e
 
8t 2 R : Pf
j
 tg  Pf
j 1
 tg

: (13)
Thus, using stochastic order allows a decay of reliability which takes place when fault are
inserted. Prior distribution of rv 
i
is Gamma with parameters  et  (i). It can be shown that
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Figure 2: A path of the stochastic intensity for (LV)
inequality (13) holds when  () is a monotonic increasing function of i. Given 
i
= 
i
, rv
X
i
has an exponential distribution with parameter 
i
. Unconditional distribution of rv X
i
is a
Pareto distribution with pdf
f(x
i
; ;  (i)) =
 (i)

(x
i
+  (i))
+1
:
Thus, the “true” hazard rate of X
i
is r
i
(t ; ;  (i)) = =(t +  (i)). In [29], parameters 
and  are estimated using Bayesian method. The corresponding model is called a Hierarchical
Bayesian model in [2] and is also a 1-memory SEPP. If  () is linear in i, we have
R
i
(t) =

 (i+ 1)
t+  (i+ 1)


; MTTF
i
=
 (i+ 1)
   1
:
We also mention the Schick-Wolverton’s model [30] where (t ; H
t
;; N) = (N  
N(t))(t  T
N(t)
) and  > 0; N are the same parameters as for (JM).
3.2.4 m  2-memory
Instances of such models are rare. For m = 2, we have the time-series models in [31], [32].
For m > 2, we have the adaptative concatenated failure rate model from [33] and the Weibull
models of Pham [34]. We refer to original contributions for details.
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4 White-box modeling
Most work on software reliability assessment adopts the black-box view of the system, in which
only the interactions with the environment are considered. The white-box (or structural) point
of view is an alternative approach in which the structure of the system is explicitly taken into
account. This is advocated for instance in [35], [36]. Specifically, the structure-based approach
allows analyzing the sensitivity of the reliability of the system with respect to the reliability of
its components. Up to recently, only a few papers proposed structure-based software reliability
models. A representative sample was (in discrete time) [35], [37], [38] and (in continuous time)
[39],[36], [19],[40]. An up-to-date review on the architecture-based approach is given in [41].
We will present the main features of the basic Littlewood’s model which are common to most
previous cited works. The discrete time counterpart is Cheung’s model.
In a first step, Littlewood defines an execution model of the software. The basic entity is the
standard software engineering concept of module as for instance in [35]. The software structure
is then represented by the call graph of the set M of the modules. These modules interact by
execution control transfer and, at each instant, control lies in one and only one of the modules
which is called the active one. From such a view of the system, we build up a continuous time
stochastic process (X
t
)
t0
which indicates the active module at each time t. (X
t
)
t0
is assumed
to be a homogeneous Markov process on the set M.
In a second step, Littlewood describes the failure processes associated with execution ac-
tions. Failure may happen during a control transfer between two modules or during an execution
period of any module. During a sojourn of the execution process in the module i, failures are
part of Poisson process having parameter 
i
. When control is transferred from module i 2 M
to module j 2M, a failure may happen with probability (i; j). Given a sequence of executed
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modules, the failure processes associated with each state are independent. Also, the interface
failure events are independent on each other and on the failure processes occurring when a
module is active.
The architecture of the software is combined with the failure behavior of the modules and
that of interfaces into a single model which can then be analyzed. This method is referred
as the “composite-method” according to the classification of Markov models in the white-box
approach proposed in [41]. Basically, we are still interested in the counting process N().
Another interesting point process is obtained by assuming that the probability of a secondary
failure during a control transfer is 0. Thus, assuming that (i; j) = 0 for all i; j 2 M in
the previous context, we get a Poisson process whose parameter is modulated by the Markov
process (X
t
)
t0
. This is also called a Markov Modulated Poisson Process (MMPP). It is well-
known (e.g. [17]) that the stochastic intensity of a MMPP with respect to the history H
t
_ F
0
,
where F
0
= (X
s
; s  0), is 
X
t
. Thus, N() is an instance of a DSPP.
Asymptotic analysis and transient assessment of distribution of rv N(t) may be carried out
in observing that the bivariate process (X
t
; N(t))
t0
is a jump Markov process with state space
M N. Computation of all standard reliability metrics may be performed as in [42],[43]. We
refer to these papers for details and for calibration of the models.
It can be argued that models of Littlewood-type are inappropriate to capture a reliability
growth of the software. In fact, Laprie et al. [19] has developed a method to incorporate such
a phenomenon which can be used, for instance, in the Littlewood’s model to take into account
reliability growth of modules in the assessment of the overall reliability (see [43]).
In the original papers about Littlewood’s model for modular software, it is claimed that if
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failure parameters decrease to 0 then N() is asymptotically a HPP with parameter
 =
X
i2M
(i)

X
j2M
Q(i; j)(i; j) + 
i

;
where Q is the irreducible generator of the Markov process (X
t
)
t0
and  its stationary dis-
tribution. (i) is to be interpreted as the proportion of time the software passed in module i
(over a long time period). We just discuss the case of a MMPP. Convergence to 0 of the failure
parameters 
i
(i 2 M) may be achieved in multiplying each of them by a positive scalar ", and
in considering that " decreases to 0. So that, the new stochastic intensity of the MMPP is "
X
t
.
As " tends to 0, it is easily seen from a MMPP with a modulating two-states Markov process
(X
t
)
t0
that, for the first failure time T , probability PfT > tg converges to 1. Therefore, we
can not obtain an exponential approximation to the distribution of rv T as " tends to 0. Thus, we
can not expect to derive a Poisson approximation to the distribution of N(). In fact, the right
statement is: if failure parameters are much smaller than the switching rates between modules,
N() is approximately a HPP with parameter . For a MMPP, a proof is given in [44] using
martingale theory. Moreover, the rate of convergence in total variation of finite dimensional-
distributions of N() to those of the HPP is shown to be in ". This last fact is important because
user has no information on the quality of the Poissonian approximation given in [36]. However,
there is no rule to decide a priori if the approximation is optimistic or pessimistic (see [43]).
A similar approach to [44] is used in [45] to derive Poisson approximation and rate of conver-
gence for more general pp than MMPP, including the complete Littlewood’s counting process
[46], the counting model of [43]. Such asymptotic results give a “hierarchical-method” [41] for
reliability prediction: we solve the architectural model and superimpose the failure behavior of
the modules and that of the interfaces on to the solution to predict reliability.
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5 Calibration of model
Suppose that we have selected one of the black-box models of Section 3. We obtain reliability
metrics which depend on the unknown parameters of the model. Thus, we hate to estimate
these metrics from the failure data. We briefly review standard methods to get point-estimates
in Subsections 5.1, 5.2.
One major goal of the SR modeling is to predict the future value of metrics from the gath-
ered failure data. It is clear from Section 3 that a central problem in SR is to select a model
because the huge number of available models. Criteria to compare SR models are listed in [3].
The authors propose quality of assumptions, applicability, simplicity and predictive validity.
To assess the predictive validity of models, we need methods which are not only based on a
goodness-of-fit approach. Various techniques may be used: u-plot, prequential likelihood, etc.
We do not discuss this issue here. A good account for predictive validation methods are given in
[47], [48], [4, Chap 4], [3], [11] where comparisons between models are also carried out. Note
also that predictive quality of a SR model may be drastically improved using preprocessing of
data. In particular, statistical tests have been designed to capture trend in data. Thus, reliability
trend analysis allows using SR models which are adapted to reliability growth, stable reliability
and reliability decrease respectively. We refer to [49], [4, Chap 10] and references therein for
details. Parameters will be denoted by  (it can be multivariate).
5.1 Frequentist procedures
Parameter  is considered as taking an unknown but fixed value. Two basic methods to estimate
the value of  are: method of maximum likelihood (ML), the least squares method. That is,
we have to optimize with respect to  an objective function which depends on  and collected
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failure data to get a point-estimate. Another standard procedure, interval estimation, gives an
interval of values as estimate of . We only present point-estimation by method of maximum
likelihood on (JM) and NHPP models. Others models may be analyzed in a similar way. ML
estimations possess several appealing properties that make the procedure widely used. Two of
these properties are the consistency and the asymptotic normality to get confidence interval for
the point-estimate. Another one is that the ML estimates of f() (for one-to-one function f ) is
simply f(b) where b is the ML estimate of . We refer to [3, Ch 12] for a complete view of the
frequentist inference procedures in SR modeling context.
Example 5.1 (JM) Parameters are  and N . Assume that failure data are given by observed
values x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
i
) of rv’s X
1
; : : : ; X
i
. If (;N) are the true values of parameters, then
the likelihood to observe x is defined as
L(;N ; x) = f
X
1
;::: ;X
i
(x ; ;N) (14)
where f
X
1
;::: ;X
i
( ; ;N) is the pdf of the joint distribution of X
1
; : : : ; X
i
. The estimate
(
b
;
b
N) of (;N) will be the value of (;N) which maximizes the likelihood to observe data x:
f
X
1
;::: ;X
i
(x ;
b
;
b
N) = max
;N
L(;N ; x). Maximizing the likelihood function is equivalent
to maximizing the log-likelihood function lnL(;N ; x). From the independence of rv’s (X
i
)
and (14), we obtain that
lnL(;N ; x) = ln
i
Y
k=1
(N   (k   1)) exp
 
  (N   (k   1))x
k

:
Estimates (b; bN) are solution of @
@
lnL(;N ; x) =
@
@N
lnL(;N ; x) = 0:
b
 =
i
b
N
P
i
k=1
x
k
 
P
i
k=1
(k   1)x
k
i
X
k=1
1
b
N   (k   1)
=
i
b
N  
1
P
i
k=1
x
k
P
i
k=1
(k   1)x
k
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The second equation may be solved by numerical techniques and then the solution is put into
the first equation to get b. These estimates are plugged into formulae (10) to get ML estimates
of reliability metrics.
Example 5.2 (NHPP models) Assume that failure data are t = (t
1
; : : : ; t
i
) the observed fail-
ure times. The likelihood function is given by (11). Thus, for (MO) model, ML estimates of
parameters 
0
; 
1
(where 
0
= 1=; 
1
= ) are solution of [3]
b

0
=
i
ln(1 +
b

1
t
i
)
;
1
b

1
i
X
k=1
1
1 +
b

1
t
k
=
i t
i
(1 +
b

1
t
i
) ln(1 +
b

1
t
i
)
:
Assume now that failure data are the cumulative numbers of failures n
1
; : : : ; n
i
at some
instants d
1
; : : : ; d
i
. The likelihood function is from the independence and Poisson distribution
of the increments of the counting process N()
L( ; t) =
i
Y
k=1
(

(d
k
)  

(d
k 1
))
n
k
 n
k 1
(n
k
  n
k 1
)!
exp
 
  (

(d
k
)  

(d
k 1
))

(d
0
= n
0
= 0);
where 

() is the mean value function of N() given that  is the true value of the parameter.
For (GO) model, parameters are M; and their ML estimates are
c
M =
n
i
1  exp( d
i
)
d
i
exp( d
i
)n
i
1   exp( d
i
)
=
i
X
k=1
(n
k
  n
k 1
)(d
k
exp( d
k
)  d
k 1
exp( d
k 1
))
exp( d
k 1
)  exp( d
k
)
:
The second equation is solved by numerical techniques and the solution is incorporated into the
first equation to get cM . Estimation of reliability metrics are obtained as for (JM).
5.2 Bayesian procedure
An alternative to frequentist procedures is to use Bayesian statistics. Parameter  is considered
as a value of a rv . A prior distribution of  has to be selected. This distribution represents
the a priori knowledge on the parameter and is assumed to have a pdf 

(). Now, from the
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failure data x, we have to update our knowledge on . If L( ; x) is the likelihood function of
the data, then Bayes theorem is used as updating formula: pdf of the posterior distribution of 
given data x is
f
jx
() =
L( ; x) 

()
R
R
L( ; x)

()d
:
Now, we find an estimate b of  by minimizing the so-called posterior expected loss:
R
R
l(
b
; )f
jx
()d
where l(; ) is the loss function. With a quadratic loss function l(b; ) = (b   )2, it is well-
known that the minimum is obtained by the conditional expectation
b
 = E[ j x] =
Z
R
f
jx
()d:
It is just the mean of the posterior distribution of . Note that all SR models involve two or more
parameters, so that the previous integral must be considered as multidimensional. Therefore
computation of such integrals are by numerical techniques. Since a decade, progress has been
made on such methods: e.g. Monte Carlo Markov Chain methods (see e.g. [50]).
Note that prior distribution can also be parametric. In general, Gamma or Beta distribu-
tions are used. So that, additional parameters need to be estimated. This may be carried out
by using the ML method. For instance, this is the case for function  () in the (LV) model in
[28]. However, such estimates may be derived in the Bayesian framework and we obtain a hi-
erarchical Bayesian analysis of the model. Many models of Section 3 have been analyzed from
a Bayesian point of view using MCMC methods like Gibbs sampling, or data augmentation
method (see [51] for (JM), (LV); [52] for NHPP model, [53] for S-shaped models and reference
therein).
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6 Current issues
6.1 Black-box modeling
We list some issues which are not new but covering well-documented limitations of popular
black-box models. Most of them have been recently addressed and practical validation is
needed. We will see that the prevalent approach is to use the NHPP modeling framework.
Indeed, an easy way to incorporate in a NHPP model various factors affecting the reliability of
a software, is to select a suitable parameterization of the intensity function (or ROCOF). Any
alternative model combining most these factors will be of value.
6.1.1 Imperfect debugging
The problem of imperfect debugging may be naturally addressed in the Bayesian framework.
Reliability growth is captured through deterministically nonincreasing sequence of failure rates
(r
i
()) (see (1)). In Bayesian framework, parameters of r
i
() are considered as random. So that,
we can deal with stochastically decreasing sequence of rvs (r
i
)
i
(see (13)), which allows to take
into account the uncertainty on the effect of a corrective action. An instance of this approach is
given by the (LV) model (see also [29], [34]).
Note that the binomial class of models can incorporate a defective correction of a detected
bug. Indeed, assume that each fault detected has a probability p to be removed from the soft-
ware. The hazard rate after (i   1) repairs is (N   p(i   1)) (see [23]). But, the problem of
eventual introduction of new faults is not addressed. Kremer [54] solves the case of a single in-
sertion using a nonhomogeneous birth-death Markov model. This has been extended to multiple
introductions in [55]. Shanthikumar and Sumita [56] proposed a multivariate model where mul-
tiple removing and insertions of faults are allowed at each repair. This model involved complex
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computational procedures and is not considered in literature. Recent advance in addressing the
problem of eventual insertion of new faults is concerned with finite NHPP models. It consists in
generalizing the basic proportionality between the intensity function and the expected number
of remaining faults at time t of (GO) model (see Example 3.2) in
(t) = (t)[n(t)  (t)]
where (t) represents a time-dependent detection-rate of a fault; n(t) is the number of faults in
the software at time t, including those already detected and removed and those inserted during
the debugging process ((t) =  and n(t) = M in (GO)). Making () time-dependent allows
representing a phenomenon of learning process which is closely related to the changes in the
efficiency of testing. This function can monotonically increase during testing period. Select a
nondecreasing S-shaped curve as () gives an usual S-shaped NHPP model. Further details
may be found in [6, Chap 5] and references therein.
Another basic way to consider insertion of new faults is to use a marked point process
(MPP) (e.g. [15, Chap 4]). We have the pp of failure detection times T
1
< T
2
<    and
with each date T
i
, we associate a mark M
i
which represents the cumulative number of faults
removed and inserted during the debugging phase. We retrieve a usual pp if all marks are 1. For
such a model, we are interested in the mark-accumulator process
P
N(t)
i=0
M
i
(M
0
= 0). A basic
instance of MPP is the compound Poisson Process where N() is a HPP and M
i
’s are i.i.d. and
independent of N(). This may also be used to model clustering of failures (see [57]). Such
MPP are not SEPP of Section 3.1 because orderliness condition fails. This framework was used
by van Pul [18] to extend models of (JM) type to incorporate the possibility of inserting new
faults during repair.
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6.1.2 Early prediction of software reliability
A major limitation of SR models of Section 3 for software engineering community is to provide
no help for managing in the earlier phase of development (or testing) of a product. Indeed,
calibration of these black-box models requires a relatively large set of failure data. This is rarely
encountered in the earlier life-cycle of a software. In some sense, we are now concerned with
the general topic of software quality assessment (which includes dependability concepts) with
no failure data. Thus, we have to develop statistical models of quality which are not directly
related to the knowledge of a part of the failure process. In such a case, model must be based on
a priori information on the product: judgment of experts, quality of the development process,
similar existing products, software complexity, etc. Incorporating subjective information leads
naturally to Bayesian statistics. We refer to [2, Chap 5,6] for discussion in this context. Since
we are mainly interested in reliability assessment, we restrict ourselves to more and less recent
issues relying quality control to the software reliability.
A widespread idea is that complexity of a software is an influent factor of the reliability
attributes. Much work has been devoted to quantify the software complexity through software
metrics (see e.g. [58]). Typically, we compute Halstead and McCabe metrics which are program
size and control flow measures respectively. It is worthy of note that most software complexity
metrics are strongly related to the concept of structure of software code. Thus, including com-
plexity factor in SR may be thought of as a first attempt to take into account the architecture of
a software in reliability assessment. We turn back to this issue in Subsection 6.2. Now, how
to include complexity attributes in earlier reliability analysis? Most of recent research focus on
the identification of software modules which are likely fault-prone from data of various com-
plexity metrics. In fact, we are faced with a typical problem of data analysis that explains why
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literature on this subject is mainly concerned with procedures of multivariate analysis: linear
and nonlinear regression methods, classification methods, techniques of discriminant analysis.
We refer to [4, Chap 12], [59],[60] and references therein for details.
Another empirical evidence suggests that the higher the test coverage, the higher the relia-
bility of the software would be. Thus, a model which incorporates information on functional
testing as soon as it is available is of value. This issue is addressed in a NHPP model proposed
in [61]. It consists in defining an appropriate parameterization of a finite NHPP model which
relates software reliability to the measurements that can be obtained from the code during func-
tional testing. Let a be the expected number of faults that would be detected given infinite time
testing. The intensity function () is assumed to be proportional to the expected number of
remaining failures: (t) = [a   (t)](t) where (t) is the hazard rate per-fault. Finally, the
time-dependent function (t) is of the form
(t) =
dc(t)
dt
1   c(t)
where c(t) is the coverage function. That is, the ratio of the number of potential fault-sites
covered by time t divided by the total number of potential fault-sites under consideration during
testing. Function c(t) is assumed to be continuous and monotone as function of time testing.
Specific forms of function c() allow retrieving some well-known finite failure models: expo-
nential function c(t) = 1   exp( t) corresponds to the (GO); Weibull coverage function
c(t) = 1   exp ( t

) corresponds to the generalized (GO) model [62]; S-shaped coverage
function correspond to S-shaped models [25], etc. Gokhale et al propose to use a log-logistic
function. We refer to [61] for details. Such a parameterization leads to estimate a and the pa-
rameters of function c(). The model may be calibrated according to the different phase of the
software life-cycle. Here, in early phase of testing, an approach is to estimate a from software
28
metrics (using procedures of multivariate analysis) and measure coverage during the functional
testing using a coverage measurement tool (see e.g. [4, Chap 13]). Thus, we get early prediction
of reliability (see [63] for an alternative using information from testing phases of similar past
projects).
6.1.3 Environmental factors
Most SR models in Section 3 ignore the factors affecting software reliability. In some sense,
previously issues discussed in this section can be considered as an attempt to capture some
environmental factors. Imperfect debugging is related to the fact that new faults may be inserted
during a repair. Complexity attributes of a software is strongly correlated to its fault-proness.
Empirical investigations show that the development process, testing procedure, programmer
skill, human factors, the operational profile and many others factors affect the reliability of a
product (see e.g. [64], [4, Chap 13], [65], [66] and references therein). A major issue is to
incorporate all these attributes into a single model. At the present time, investigation focus on
functional relationship between the hazard rate r
i
() of the software and quantitative measures
of the various factors. In this context, a well-known model is the so-called Cox proportional
hazard model (PHM) where r
i
() is assumed to be an exponential function of the environmental
factors:
r
i
(t) = r(t) exp
 
n
X
j=1

j
z
j
(i)
!
(15)
where z
j
()’s, called the explanatory variables or covariates, are the measures of the factors and

j
’s are the regression coefficients. r() is a baseline hazard rate that gives the hazard rate when
all covariates are set to 0. Therefore, given z = (z
1
; : : : ; z
n
), the reliability function R
i
is
R
i
(t j z) = R(t) exp
 
n
X
j=1

j
z
j
(i)
!
(16)
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with R(t) = exp

 
R
t
0
r(s)ds

. Formula (15) expresses the effect of accelerating or deceler-
ating the time to failure given z. Note that covariates may be time-dependent, random. In this
last case the reliability function will be the expectation of function in (16). Baseline hazard rate
may be any of the hazard rates used in Section 3. The family of parameters can be estimated
using ML. Note that one of the reasons for the popularity of PHM is that the unknown 
j
’s may
be estimated by the partial likelihood approach without putting a parametric structure on the
baseline hazard rate. We refer to [67], [68], [11], [69] for general discussion on Cox regression
models. Applications of PHM to software reliability modeling are given in [12, Chap 7], [70],
[71] and references therein. Recently, Pham derives in [72] an enhanced proportional hazard
(JM) model.
A general way to represent influence of environmental factors on reliability is to assume that
stochastic intensity of the counting process N() is a function of some m stochastic processes
E
1
(t); : : : ; E
m
(t) or covariates
(t ; H
t
;F
0
) = f(t; E
1
(t); : : : ; E
m
(t); T
1
; : : : ; T
N(t)
; N(t))
where H
t
is the past up to time t of the pp and F
0
encompasses the specification of the paths
of all covariates. Thus, function (t ; H
t
;F
0
) may be thought of as the stochastic intensity
of a SEPP driven or modulated by the multivariate environmental process (E
1
(t); : : : ; E
m
(t)).
DSPP of Subsection 3.1 is a basic instance of such models and have been widely used in com-
munication engineering and in reliability. Castillo and Siewiorek proposed in [73], a DSPP
with a cyclo-stationary stochastic intensity to represent the effect of the workload (measure of
system usage) on failure process. That is, intensity is a stochastic process assumed to have
periodic mean and autocorrelation function. A classic form for intensity of a DSPP is (E
t
),
where (E
t
) is a finite Markov process. This is the MMPP discussed in Section 4, where (E
t
)
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represented the control flow structure of the software. In the same spirit of system in a random
environment, ¨Ozekici and Sofer [65] use a pp whose stochastic intensity is (N   N(t))(E
t
),
where N N(t) is the remaining number of faults at time t andE
t
is the operation performed by
the system at t. (E
t
) is also assumed to be a finite Markov process. Transient analysis of N()
may be carried out as in [42] from the Markov property of the bivariate process (N N(t); E
t
).
We refer to [65] for details. Note that both pp are instances of SEPP with respective stochastic
intensities E[(E
t
) j H
t
] and (N  N(t))E[(E
t
) j H
t
] (H
t
is the past of the counting process
up to time t). The practical purpose of such models has to be addressed. In particular, further
investigations are needed to estimate parameters (see [74]).
6.1.4 conclusion
There exists other issues which are of value in SR engineering. In the black-box modeling
framework, we can think about alternative to approaches reported in Section 3. The problem of
SR growth assessing may be thought of as a problem of statistical analysis of data. Therefore,
prediction techniques developed in this area of research can be used. For instance, some authors
have considered neural networks (NN). The main interest as SR model is to be nonparametric.
Thus, we rejoin discussion on statistical issues of Subsection 6.3. NN may also be used as a
classification tool. For instance, identifying fault-prone modules may be performed with a NN
classifier. We refer to [4, Chap 17] and references therein for an account of the NN approach.
Empirical comparison of the predictive performance of NN models and recalibrated standard
models (as defined in [75]) is given in [76]. NN is found to be a good alternative to the standard
models.
Computing dependability metrics is not an end in itself in software engineering. A major
question is the time to release a software. In particular we have to decide when to stop testing.
31
Optimal testing time is a problem of decision making under uncertainty. A good account of
Bayesian decision theory for solving such a problem is in [2, Chap 6]. In general, software
release policies are based on reliability requirement and cost factors. We do not go into further
details here. We refer to [12, Chap 8] for a survey up to 1990s, and [77], [78] for more recent
contributions to these topics.
6.2 White-box modeling
A challenging issue in SR modeling is to define models taking into account information about
the architecture of the software. To go further, software interacts with hardware to make a
system. In order to derive model for a system made up of software and hardware, the only point
of view is a white-box approach (see [49] and [79] for an account on this topic). We focus on the
software product here. Many reasons advocate for a structure-based approach in SR modeling:
– Advancement and widespread used of object oriented systems designs. Reuse of compo-
nents.
– Softwares are developed in a heterogeneous fashion using components-based software de-
velopment.
– Early prediction methods of reliability have to take into account the influence about the
structure of a software, of testing and reliability of its components.
– Early failure data are prior to the integration phase and thus concern testing part of the soft-
ware, not the whole product.
– Addressing problem of reliability allocation, resource allocation for modular software.
– Analyze sensitivity of the reliability of the software to the reliability of its components.
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As noted in Section 4, the structure-based approach has been largely ignored. Foundations of
the Markovian models presented in Section 4 are old. Some limitations of Littlewood’s model
have been recently addressed in [43], in particular to obtain availability measures. Asymptotic
considerations in [45] show that such reliability model tends to be of Poisson-type (homoge-
neous or not depending on stationarity or not of the failure parameters) when the product has
achieved a good level of reliability. It is important to point out that no experience with such
kinds of models is reported in the literature. Maybe it is related to questionable assumptions of
modeling, as the Markov exchanges of control between modules.
An alternative way to represent the interactions between components of software is to use
one of the available modeling tools which are based on stochastic petri nets, SAN network,
etc. But, if many of them offer a high flexibility in the representation of the behavior of the
software, computation of various metrics are very often performed using automatic generation
of Markov chain. So that, these approaches are subject to traditional limitation of Markov
modeling: failure rate of the components are not time-dependent; the generated state-space is
intractable from the computational point of view; etc.
To overcome limitations of an analytic approach, a widespread method in performance anal-
ysis of system is discrete-event simulation. This point of view was initiated by Lyu (see [4,
Chap 16]) for software dependability assessment. The idea is to represent the behavior of each
component as a nonhomogeneous Markov process whose dynamic evolution only depends on a
hazard rate function. At any time t, this hazard rate function depends on the number of failures
observed from the component up to time t, as well as the execution time experienced by the
component up to time t. Then rate-based simulation technique may be used to obtain a possible
realization of such a Markovian arrivals process. The overall hazard rate of the software is actu-
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ally a function of the number of failures observed from each component up to time t and of the
amount of execution time experienced by each component. We refer to [4, Chap 16] and [80]
for details. In some sense, the approach is to simulate the failure process from the stochastic
intensity of the counting process of failures.
Long since, the theory of “coherent-system” allows analyzing a system made up of n com-
ponents through the so-called structure function. If x
i
(i = 1; : : : ; n) denotes the state of
component i (x
i
= 1 if component i is up and 0 otherwise) then the state of the system is
obtained from computation of the structure function
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) =

1 if system is up
0 if system is down.
Function  describes the functional relationship between the state of system and the state of
its components. Many textbooks on reliability review methods for computing reliability from
complex function  assuming that state of each component is a Bernoulli random variable (see
e.g. [17, Chap 2]). An instance of representation of a 2-module software by a structure function
taken into account control flow and data flow is discussed in [2, Chap 7]. This “coherent-
system” approach is widely used to analyze the reliability of communication networks. How-
ever, it is well-known that exact computation of reliability is then a NP-hard problem. Thus,
only structure functions of few dozens of components can be exactly analyzed. Large systems
have to be assessed by Monte-Carlo simulation techniques (see e.g. [81], [82]). Moreover, in
case of fault-tolerant software, we are faced with a highly reliable system which involves so-
phisticated simulation procedures to overcome limitations of standard ones. In such a context,
an alternative consists in using binary decision diagrams (see [4, Chap15], [83]). We point out
that structure function is mainly a functional representation of the system. Thus, many issues
discussed in the context black-box modeling also have to be addressed. For instance, how to
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incorporate environmental factors identified in [34]?
As we can see, a great deal of research is needed to obtain a white-box model which offers
the advantages motivating development of such an approach. Opening the “black-box” to get
accurate models is a hard task. Many aspects have to be addressed: definition of what is the
structure or architecture of software; what kind of data can be expected to future calibration of
models and so on. A first study of the potential sources of SR data available during development
is given in [84]. This would help the creation of some benchmark data sets which will allow
validating white-box models. What is clear is that actual progress in white-box modeling can
only be achieved from an active interaction between the statistics and software engineering
communities. All this surely explains why the prevalent approach in SR is the black-box’s one.
6.3 Statistical issues
A delicate issue in SR is the statistical properties of estimators used to calibrate models. Main
drawbacks of ML method are well-documented in the literature. Finding ML estimators require
solving equations which may not always have a solution or may give an inappropriate solution.
For instance, Littlewood and Verrall give in [85], a criterion for bN = 1 and b = 0 (with
finite nonzero b = bN b) to be the unique solution of ML equations for (JM) model. Problem
of solving ML equations in SR modeling is addressed in [86], [87], [88], [89]. Another well-
known drawback is that such ML estimators are usually unstable with small data sets. This
situation is basic in SR. Moreover, note that certain models like (JM) assume that software
contains a finite number of faults. So, using standard asymptotic properties of ML estimators
may be questionable. Such asymptotic results are well-known in the case of i.i.d. sample. But
in SR, sample are not i.i.d. That explains why recent investigations on asymptotic normality
and consistency of ML estimators for standard SR models use framework of martingale theory
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which allows dependence in data. Note that overcoming conceptually finite (expected) num-
ber of faults needs unusual concept of asymptotic properties. A detailed discussion is given in
[18] and references therein, in [88] for NHPP models. Such works are important because these
asymptotic properties are the foundations of interval estimation (a standard alternative to point
estimate), of the derivation of confidence interval for parameters, of studies on asymptotic vari-
ance of estimators, etc. All these topics must be addressed in details to improve the predictive
quality of SR models.
It is clear that any model works well with failure data which correspond to the basic as-
sumptions of the model. But given data, a large part of models is inappropriate. A natural way
to overcome too stringent assumptions, in particular of distributional type, is to use nonpara-
metric models. However, the parametric approach remains highly prevalent in SR modeling.
Major attempt to gap this fill is [90], where a completely monotonic ROCOF is estimated by
regression techniques (see also [91]). A recent work of Littlewood and co-authors [92] uses
nonparametric estimates for the distribution of inter-failure times (X
i
). This is based on kernel
methods for pdf estimation (see [93]). Conclusion of authors is that results are not very im-
pressive but more investigation is needed, in particular using various kernel functions. We can
think for instance to wavelets ([94]). Similar discussion may be done in Bayesian approach of
SR modeling. Specifically, most bayesian inference for NHPP assumes a parametric model for
ROCOF and proceeds with prior assumption on the unknown parameters. In such a context, an
instance of a nonparametric bayesian approach has recently been used in [95]. Conceptually,
nonparametric approach is promising, but is computationally intensive in general and is not
easy to comprehend.
These developments may be viewed as preliminary works using statistical methods based
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on the so-called dynamic approach of counting processes as reported for instance in the book
of Andersen et al [69] (the bibliography gives a large account for research on this area). The
Aalen pioneer-work was on the multiplicative intensity model which, roughly speaking, writes
the stochastic intensity associated with a counting process as
(t ; H
t
; (Y
s
; s  t)) = (t)Y (t)
where () is a nonnegative deterministic function, whereas Y () is a nonnegative observable
stochastic process whose value at any time t is known just before t (Y () is a predictable pro-
cess). Nonparametric estimation for such a model is discussed in [69, Chap 4]. A Cox-type
model may be obtained in choosing Y (t) = exp

P
j

j
Z
j
(t)

with stochastic processes as co-
variates Z
j
(see [96]). We can also consider additive intensity models when the multiplicative
form involves multivariate functions () and Y () (e.g. see [97]). Conceptually, this dynamic
approach is appealing because it is well supported by a lot of theoretic results. It is worthy
of note that martingale theory may be of some value for analyzing static models as capture-
recapture models (see [98], [99] for details). Thus, applicability of the dynamic point of view
on pp in the small data set context of software engineering is clearly a direction of further in-
vestigations (see e.g.[18] for such an account). Moreover, if it is shown that gain in predictive
validity is high with respect to standard approaches, then a user-oriented “transfer of technol-
ogy” must follow. That is, friendly tools for using such statistical material must be developed.
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